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COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
MICHAL STRÍŽENEC 
To improve cooperation between psychology of thinking and artificial intelligence, it could 
be useful to elucidate the present theoretical approaches to thinking. The latter have also been 
affected by cybernetics and computer science (informational approaches, problem space, heuristics 
computer simulation, frames and scripts). More recently, cognitive psychology has become 
crystallized, concentrating on complex cognitive systems. Within its framework considerable 
attention is now being devoted to mental representation, which is the object of our investigation. 
Cooperation between psychology and artificial intelligence contributes to reveal specific mecha-
nism of cognition and to promote further development of the theory of artificial intelligence and 
its practical application. 
Following a period of heated controversies between those advocating that think-
ing is a faculty exclusively proper to man, on the one hand, and adherents of a cyber-
netic reductionism, on the other, a genuine search has been initiated over the past 
decade for a common language on the interface psychology of thinking/artificial 
intelligence. An impetus to this came particularly from the practical need of setting 
up complex systems involving a symbiosis of human and technical elements. On the 
psychology's side, this was prompted mainly by the development of cognitive psy-
chology. 
1. HUMAN THINKING 
It is generally being admitted that psychology of thinking has lagged behind 
in its development. This may be the result of considerable methodological difficulties 
facing research in this domain, but may also be due to a varying interpretation 
of thinking within diverse theoretical conceptions. Psychology in North America 
has concentrated mainly on behaviorism which derives thinking from the scheme 
"stimulus-response" as the basic unit of behaviour, laying emphasis on directly 
observable phenomena. Image is considered as a form of implicit behaviour and stress 
is laid on the peripheral mechanisms of thinking. Neobehaviourism in turn, investigat-
es relations between reinforcement and activation, with cognitive component being 
related to the background. Although behaviourism has stimulated extensive research 
in the domain of learning, an application of these metodological approaches to 
thinking has proved barren. 
One of the nativistic theories is Gestalt psychology [1] which defined the problem 
situation and method. However, a task is here considered as something extraneous 
in relation to an individual's thinking: it is not taken as being involved in the condi-
tions of man's activity. Here stress is laid on a new arrangement of the structure 
of relations in a given problem situation (a perceptual reorganization of the problem) 
which takes place in virtue of an immediate outlook, shape, form. A study of problem 
solving makes use in particular of the method of thinking aloud. 
A significant contribution to the psychology of thinking has been the work by 
Piaget [2] who considered units of the cognitive structure - schemas - as products 
of an assimilating and accomodating contact with the environment in time. The 
schema is an internalized representation of a class of similar activities permitting 
a thinking experiment (operation on representations of reality). According to Piaget, 
the essence of thinking does not reside in a representation of stimuli, but in a "inter-
nalized" manipulation of the object. The internal mechanism of construing (within 
known stages: sensorimotor schemas, concrete operations and formal operations) 
represents in fact a process tending to achieve an adaptive equilibrium in terms 
of self-regulation. 
A further contribution that might be mentioned here is that by Bruner [3] who holds 
that the basis of thinking processes is a selection and verification of hypotheses. This 
involves forms of cognitive regulation of external behaviour: they are considered 
to be primitive facts. Brunner's contribution to concept learning is generally re-
cognized, particularly his analysis of the subject's strategies (focusing, scanning, 
conservative focusing, wholist focusing). In this view, the key to an understanding 
of cognitive development are representations. He distinguishes three modes of repre-
sentation: with acting — motor principle, is related to enactive representation, 
then follows the iconic (picture) representation and lastly the symbolic representation. 
In Soviet psychology the best known conception of thinking is that enunciated by 
Rubinshteyn [4], especially his observation on the effect of external causes through 
the intermediary of internal conditions (psychic properties, states, processes). Cogni-
tive processes cbnnot be explained solely on the basis of internal subjective conditions, 
nor are they merely a function of the external situation. This involves an elaboration 
of the principle of determinism. The author has further characterized analysis 
through synthesis as being the fundamental mechanism of thinking activity. 
Among the most recent approaches to the analysis of thinking in Soviet psychology 
is Zinchenko's [5] microstructural analysis of cognitive processes. Some of the 
prevailing theories on thinking - Dodd and Bourne [6] differentiate those of the 
information processing theory, Piaget's theory and the nativistic theory — lay 
emphasis on the schema, the internal structure, a hierarchical description. Thinking 
is considered to be a process or mechanism controlling behaviour. One of the draw-
backs, however, is the considerable distance between empirical research and theory. 
Thinking is today characteristically considered as the highest degree of cognitive 
processes and in narrower terms is made to include concept forming and acquisition, 
problem solving and judging. A rather narrow, operationalist point of view becomes 
manifest in an identification of thinking with problem solving: as a matter of fact, 
thinking is needed also in formulating tasks, elucidating new problems, acquiring 
concepts, understanding a text in reading, etc. 
One may subscribe to Brushlinsky's [7, p. 52] view that "thinking is inseparably 
connected with language social process of an independent searching for and discover-
ing of something essentially new, i.e. a mediated and generalized reflection of reality 
during the course of its analysis and synthesis, formed on the basis of practical 
activity from a sensory knowledge and far exceeding its borders". 
2. EFFECT OF CYBERNETICS, COMPUTER SCIENCE 
ON PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING 
New approaches to research of thinking have been considerably affected by cyber-
netics and more recently by its latest discipline — artificial intelligence. Even though 
they have not become a miraculous instrument for explaining human thinking-
psychology of thinking is, however, indebted to them for decisive impulse and a revival 
of interest in its theory. Reference shall here be made to some major contribution 
only. 
As regards to information theory, it has roused interest in semantic information, 
in a probabilistic characteristic of the structure of a task, in duration of problem 
solving, algorithmic thinking processes, in the task of subjective probability or reduc-
tion of uncertainty, in information acquisition, etc. These issues were dealt in more 
detail in our monograph [8]. A considerable contribution in the domain of theoretical 
conceptions of thinking has been made by Klix and his team. In his latest compre-
hensive monograph [9] he considers psychic processes as well as thinking to be 
essentially a process of information exchange between man and the environment. 
He makes out three classes of problem situation: 
a) The initial state is given, possible or accessible transformations are known, and 
the required final state is to be found (e.g. chess); 
b) The final state is given, the transformations are known, and it is necessary to 
determine as to from what initial state can the final state be deduced (e.g. physico-
chemical analysis); 
c) Both the initial and the final states are given and such transformations (rules) 
are sought that permit the transformation from one state to the other (e.g. con-
struction tasks). 
The author presents a detailed analysis of the structure and elements of problem 
space in which the solution is sought. If the solution is outside it, the problem space 
has first to be enlarged. Heuristic aspects are also applied in the search, i.e. rules 
for transforming the states of the problem; they are abstracted from the set of problem 
situations and may be applied to classes of problems. Klix analyzes the effect of 
heuristic strategies on the example of the Hanoi tower. Nevertheless, when analyzing 
problem solutions, one may not confine oneself purely to structural aspects, but has 
to take into account also the effect of semantics. 
Dorner [10, 11] assumes two levels in the structure of the human cognitive appa-
ratus: a data base (epistemic structure) and conscious thinking (heuristic structure), 
both of which are memory structures. Processes of conscious thinking may be descri-
bed as stages in information processing. The predominant part of our behaviour 
is controlled solely by the epistemic structures (reproductive thinking). The heuristic 
structure comprises a construction of unknown transformations (heuristics), a set 
of plans and their organization in memory. In addition, the author also points to 
a possibility of developing abilities to solve problems. In the epistemic structure, 
production of complexes, their disintegration, creation of macro-operators may 
improve. Improvement of the overall strategy implies influencing of the heuristic 
structure. 
An emphasis on hypotheses in the thinking processes may be noted in works 
by Groner [12] who wants to extend the existing models of hypotheses to problems 
of organization (from a series of paired data one has to construct a rank order of 
elements — e.g. Peter is taller than Paul. Paul is smaller than John . . . Which of 
them is the taller?). From among the familiar approaches in this domain he mentions 
computer simulation, propositional models, formalization with the aid of logic, 
algebra and the theory of automata, as also probabilistic models. He also defines 
the basic concepts of the general theory of hypotheses. 
Besides syntheses of thinking models with the aid of computer stimulation, we also 
find here efforts at isolation elementary mental operations [13]. These may then be 
divided on the basis of the dimension of speciality (according to the range of the tasks 
to which they are connected, we distinguish specific and general operations) and 
dynamics (variability during a given task — hence, permanent and temporary). 
Thus we obtain structure (specific and permanent), sign (general and permanent), 
strategy (specific and temporary) and state (general and temporary). 
The investigation of heuristics (particulary of heuristic programming) has exerted 
a considerable influence on research in psychology of thinking: there came a definite 
turning away from static laboratory situations (until then current in general psycho-
logy), leading towards an analysis of the thinking processes taking place in the solu-
tion of complex problems of a realistic nature. Newell and Simon [14] hold that 
complex thinking processes are built up out of elementary processes present in sym-
bol manipulation, and predicate GPS as the basis of a theory of human problem 
solving, although they are aware that GPS do not simulate all the aspects of man's 
behaviour. A further programme for simulating thinking is the system known as 
ARGUS [15] which is based on a network of semantic elements and sequential 
control. Several cognitive processes here take place simultaneously and information 
structure become altered. 
Psychological concepts are closely related to the frames theory [16] investigating 
the data structure for portraying a stereotype situation and completing it with 
specific data. This takes contact with a psychological understanding of schema or 
knowledge units (Bartlett, Piaget). 
A feature recently much in vogue in psychology is a processing of the script concept 
[17]. This involves a cognitive structure portraying a stereotype sequence of events 
(usually from daily life). Computer programmes have been elaborated for under-
standing simple texts dealing with such events (SAM, FRUMP, POLITICS). A script 
may be concerned with a possible occurrence of events, but also with the order 
of their occurrence. Furthermore, the existence is assumed of metascripts — ab-
stractly formulated scripts with a minimum of specifications and structures of know-
ledge that marshall various "scenes" into a coherent sequence of behaviour. This 
is a handy tool in experimental psychology for investigating cognitive schemas 
(use is here made e.g. of method of omitting important events from the sequence). 
Social psychology, in turn, makes use of the environment context evoking a certain 
behavioural script in studying social behaviour. 
3. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND QUESTIONS OF MENTAL 
REPRESENTATION 
Cognitive psychology is a certain methodological approach rather than an exactly 
defined area of investigation or a new discipline. A Marxist and an idealist (mentalism 
and phenomenologism) orientation have come to be evolved in it. It concentrates 
on complex cognitive systems or structures. According to Estes [18] it investigates 
every aspect of information processing, acquisition of concepts about the world 
and their utilization in decision-making and carrying out of activity. 
A wholist and structural-informational approach to knowledge (an antithesis 
to traditional functional psychology) stands in the foreground; as a result of a mutual 
activity and conditioning of cognitive processes, the sharp separation between 
perception and thinking is toned down; is not altogether abliterated, the generalizing 
memory function ensuring its transition to thinking. The various processes are 
understood as successive stages in the solution of the relevant task. The regulatory 
elements are elucidated here within the framework of a single functional structure. 
According to Rogovin [19. p. 125] "cognitive psychology is a considerable step 
forward in comparison with the preceding periods of general psychology". 
Klix [20] sees in cognitive psychology an integrating value that derives from 
its orientation to invariant attributes of those psychological proccesses which are 
based on information reception, processing and utilization. He advocates the 
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need of unifying two great areas of research — cognitive and motivational psychology. 
As a matter of fact, semantic structures represent an individual reflection of reality 
and also characterize their bearer's personality. 
From more recent attempts at a synthetic presentation of the problems relating 
to cognitive psychology, mention might be made of those by Wickelgren [21] whose 
theoretical conception is derived from a combination of the associative, structural-
linguistic and informational approach. 
According to Simon [22], the conception of information processing has totally 
altered the face of cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, the models originally formed 
for various components (perception, memory, problem solving) should be integrated 
according to common architectonic principles and thus be made to contribute 
to the general theory explaining human knowledge in all its manifestations. 
At least some of the new approaches to an investigation of thinking might be 
noted briefly. Rasmussen [23] in his scheme of data processing by man laid stress on 
a cooperation between a high-capacity system of parallel processing functioning 
unconsciously and a sequential conscious processing with a limited capacity. The 
unconscious processor comprises an inner dynamic model of the world and deals 
with routine tasks (complex and exact sequences of activity are recalled with the aid 
of individual cues and are speedily realized as a result of a simple feedback control). 
The high capacity of unconscious sensorimotor functions protects the low-capacity 
conscious cognitive functions from overload in routine tasks. 
Linhart [24] deals with questions of thinking within the frame of reference of 
control of human activity (structural-functional conception). According to him, 
thinking takes place as a cognitive self-organization on the basis of a subject-object 
relationship. The highest type of self-regulation is that taking place on the plane 
of mental abstraction (man graphs the principles involved in the task solution and 
directs his activity accordingly). 
It may be inferred that cognitive psychology does not represent a unified school 
of thought (nor has it its explicit founder; theories and researches have subsequently 
been subsumed under this designation of authors who had laid stress on cognitive 
processes, their interfunctional bonds, regulatory task, similarity with steps in com-
puter information processing, etc.). Cognitive psychology with a Marxist orientation, 
however, has contributed considerably both to the theory of cognition (it justifies 
Lenin's theory of reflection) and also to social practice (cognitive aspects of work 
activity). 
Within the scope of cognitive psychology, considerable attention is being devoted 
to mental representation. The starting point of the thinking process being also the 
precondition of psychic control of behaviour, is an inner model, a mental representa-
tion. A detailed analysis of the approaches in this domain may be found in our 
studies [25], [26]. 
Our premise in an attempt at defining metal representation lies in a system approach, 
an interfunctional apprehension of psychic phenomena, and a psychic-regulatory 
conception. Studies up to now go to show that it is intersection of several psychic 
processes (isolatedly understood in functional psychology, particulary those of per-
ception, imagery, memory, thinking) that are formed in virtue of the principle 
of reflection as a result of man's activity (practical and mental) and of regulating 
this activity. It may originate on various hierarchical levels of the psychic and hence, 
may have a varying level of abstractness. This system approach my be expressed 
in different languages (e.g. symbolic, iconic, mixed). The structure and language 
of representation affect its effectiveness in the control of activity (e.g. problem 
solving, planning). No attention has so far been devoted to an incorporation of mental 
representation in to the overall personality structure. 
We have investigated the process of creating and transforming mental representa-
tion under simulated laboratory conditions with operators and undergraduates, 
making use of a matrix of 3 x 6 blank circles, in which we set up various combina-
nations of 5 black circles. Subjects were asked to remember the schema and to trans-
form it mentally (to shift it, to turn it laterally and vertically, etc.). In addition, they 
had to estimate the similarity of the schemas and underwent several psychodiagnostic 
measurements. 
The result pointed to a different degree of difficulty of various types of mental 
operations (e.g. the most difficult proved to be a mirror turning about the vertical 
axis), to the role of memory and intelligence, to the types of information coding, 
etc. For more detailed data, see [27]. 
4. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION 
The interface between psychology and the theory of artificial intelligence has come 
to be the scene of a development of the theory of modelling cognitive activity. 
Computational modelling serves psychology as a research technique and help to set up 
hypotheses on the essence of human intelligence [28]. 
To improve cooperation, it is essential to clarify the terminology (artificial intelli-
gence and psychology often make use of terms with a different real connotation) and 
to assess whether cybernetic terms permit to express the specificity of psychological 
phenomena. Thus, for instance, information theory makes no account to the "value" 
of information to man. GPS simulates only certain aspects of thinking in solving 
closed problem (it leaves out all emotional-motivational processes). Human heuristics 
is characterized by the formation of concrete goals, by a dynamic transformation 
of means to an end. Consequently, human thinking may not be reduced to informa-
tion processes and a heuristic programme does not as yet constitute a theory of 
thinking. 
A need of investigating man's psyche is especially under scored by Soviet cybernetic 
scholars when pointing out the urgency to go beyond the framework of a narrow 
technical interpretation of artificial intelligence. Its improvement will be promoted 
by an introduction of inner essential traits of the human intellect (needs, an emotional 
control of search, setting up of goals, selective image of the situation) into computer 
work [29]. If automata are to model the laws of human psyche, their inner structure 
must permit models of objects to be created and manipulated. 
On the other hand, an elaboration of a general theory of thinking should exploit 
concepts of the systems theory and of cybernetics (hierarchical organization of 
elements, mental regulatory mechanisms). A promising feature in connection with 
an inner representation appears to be a utilization of the frames theory, the fuzzy sets, 
as well as of the IA concepts on representation. 
In general, cooperation between psychology and artificial intelligence might 
contribute to detection of specific mechanisms of cognition (and particulary thinking 
activity) and to promote further development of the theory of artificial intelligence 
and its practical application. 
(Received January 5, 1984.) 
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